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Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches,
Paladin and Laurel & Hardy
CHARLES A. LAFF*
LARRY L. SARET**
The law of intellectual property has been undergoing an eccentric
reconceptualization in recent years. Much of the responsibility for
this development is attributable to a changing technology and an
expanding application of the antitrust laws. The monopolistic characteristics of intellectual property rights are usually considered exceptions to the antitrust laws and, therefore, these property rights
are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This article will describe
some recent examples of judicial attempts to define the boundaries
of intellectual property and will provide some guidance as to the
future evolution of this conceptually difficult area of the law.
There are four generally recognized classes of intellectual property: patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. Patents
protect ideas embodied in a useful form, if these ideas meet statutorily defined levels of novelty, utility and unobviousness.' Patents are
expressly provided for in the Constitution 2 and, therefore, escape
regulation under the antitrust laws so long as they are properly
obtained and used. Copyrights are also derived from an express
constitutional grant 3 and protect original writings, lectures, dramatic and musical compositions, and other works falling within
certain statutory classes.4 A common law basis for the protection of
unpublished copyrightable works is preserved by statute.5
Trademarks are words or symbols used in connection with goods.6
They serve to indicate the origin, nature, or quality of goods. The
legal basis for trademarks is both statutory and common law. The
* Partner in the patent law firm of Laff, Whitesel and Rockman, Chicago, Illinois; Instructor of Patent Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.S., 1955; J.D., 1958,
Harvard University School of Law.
** Associate in the firm of Laff, Whitesel and Rockman, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1972;
J.D., 1975, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, and 171 (1970).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. The Congress shall have power . . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
3. See note 2 supra.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 4-6 (1970).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
6. Marks used in connection with services, rather than goods, are called service marks.
The law of trademarks is generally said to include service marks.
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statutory basis for the registration of trademarks exists at both the
federal' and state8 levels. The common law basis for the protection
of trademarks is derived from the law of unfair competition.
Trade secrets may include formulas, patterns, devices, or compilations of information. However, trade secret law essentially regulates commercial conduct in that it is concerned with the duty of
one not to disclose another's confidential business information. A
trade secret, unlike a patent, trademark or copyright is not really a
separate property right.' For this reason, the common law of trade
secrets has not been preempted by the closely related area of patent
law.' 0
The above classes of intellectual property constitute the traditional means of protecting ideas. One major exception to this tradition is InternationalNews Service v. The Associated Press." In that
case, the parties were competitors engaged in the business of gathering and distributing news to newspapers across the country. To
combat the partial monopoly enjoyed by The Associated Press over
certain news sources, International News Service resorted to the
practice of taking The Associated Press news reports from bulletin
boards or from early editions of eastern papers served by The Associated Press and selling the news in the reports, either verbatim or
after rewriting, to International News Service customers. The question before the Supreme Court in International News Service was
whether this conduct violated a property right of The Associated
Press in the news or amounted to unfair competition on the part of
International News Service.
The most significant portion of InternationalNews Service was
7. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051 et seq (1970). This act, commonly called the Lanham Trade-Mark
Act, is not derived from a specific constitutional grant, but from the general powers enumerated in the commerce clause.
8. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 140, § 8 et seq. (1973).
9. RESTATEMENT oF ToRrs §§ 757, 758 (1939).
10. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas noted that a trade secret, unlike a patent, has no
property dimension. He then quoted Mr. Justice Holmes in Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland,
244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917):
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have
any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are,
through a special confidence he accepted. The property may be denied but the
confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs or one of them.
416 U.S. at 497-98.
11. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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Court's characterization of the legal rights involved. Copying of

specific news articles, which are copyrightable, was not the subject
of the controversy. It was the wholesale appropriation of the news
itself, admittedly not copyrightable, that concerned the parties. No
conventional theory of intellectual property was available to plaintiff to protect appropriation of the news itself even though defendant was obtaining, at little cost to itself, the benefits of plaintiff's
efforts at gathering the news.
In holding for the plaintiff, the Court relied upon a theory of
unfair competition; but its opinion appeared to recognize a new
property right. The Associated Press's interest in its news gathering
efforts was termed "quasi-property" in that it was a right which
existed only among competitors and not as against the public. The
Court described the news as
material . . . acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money. . . and that

defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown .

. .

. Stripped of all disguises,

the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business ....
22
Thus, this new "property" right was defined in terms of the previously accepted theories of misappropriation, unjust enrichment,
and unfair competition. The Court's opinion thus was predicated on
equitable considerations, rather than on traditional notions of an
intellectual property right. Nevertheless, the famous Brandeis
dissent 3 as well as most of the commentators, attacked the majority
opinion as the progenitor of a new method of protecting subject
matter never before credited with the attributes of a property right.
The critics reasoned that, since the legislature, in the interest of
free competition, has chosen not to protect certain items, the courts
should not devise their own method of protection regardless of the
equities.

The International News Service case has never been expressly
overruled. 4 Despite fifty years of criticism, its concepts of misappro12. Id. at 239-40.
13. 248 U.S. 215, 248 (Brandeis J., dissenting). The majority opinion has been criticized
both in the case law and by the commentators. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New
England Newspaper Pub. CoL, 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942); Chafee, Unfair Competition,
53 Hnav. L. REv. 1289 (1940). Support for the majority opinion can be found in 3 R. CALLMAN,
UNFAIR

CoMPrL-nioN,

TRADEmARKS AND MONOPOUES,

§ 60 et seq. (3d ed. 1969).

14. Since InternationalNews Service was decided as a matter of federal common law, Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), may have diminished its impact as stare decisis
in the federal courts.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

priation, unjust enrichment, and a property right born from the
marriage of equity and unfair competition, have persisted and diffused into the recognized classes of intellectual property. Therefore,
it is not surprising that there are still no boundaries to the various
classes of intellectual property. Recently, this difficulty has been
most pronounced in that area of the law which is probably most
susceptible to the equitable considerations of International News
Service: the copyright-trademark interface.
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT THEORIES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Since InternationalNews Service, misappropriation and unjust
enrichment theories have continued to receive attention in both the
state 5 and federal courts." Generally, the cause of action has been
classified as unfair competition, 7 with the federal courts exercising
either diversity or pendent jurisdiction over the state claim. Moreover, these theories have apparently survived even the stumbling
blocks of the companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co. 1 8 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.'"
At issue in Sears and Compco was state protection through the
law of unfair competition for articles which were unprotected by
federal patent or copyright law. In each case, the defendant had
copied the design of a patented light fixture. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court, had held each
patent invalid but enjoined the copying of the designs, relying on
the Illinois law of unfair competition. 0 The lower courts had found
that such copying was likely to cause confusion as to the source of
the product. In reversing, the Supreme Court in each case denied
plaintiff relief, holding that the finding of unfair competition gave
each plaintiff the equivalent of a patent monopoly even though its
patent had been held invalid. Relying on the supremacy clause of
the Constitution in denying this protection, the Court stated:
15. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Flamingo
Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (1964).
16. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds,
299 U.S. 269 (1936); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Pa. 1938).
17. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938);
Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
18. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
19. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
20. 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963); 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962).

1976]

Copyright-Trademark Interface

That Stiffel originated the pole lamp and made it popular is immaterial. "Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent
or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all - and in the
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested."
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. at 122 (1938).21
In dictum, the Court in Compco extended these comments to
uncopyrighted articles although no copyrights were involved. In
both cases, the Court emphasized that the entire body of unfair
competition law was not preempted by federal patent and copyright
law. But since the finding of likelihood of confusion in each case was
based only on the fact of copying, the Court said:
[M]ere inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart
is not enough to support an injunction against copying or an award
of damages for copying that which the federal patent laws permit
to be copied.3
The precise holding of Sears and Compco has not been clarified
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, although attempts have
been made to delineate its bounds.2 4 As a result, the effect of these
two cases on subsequent law continues to be uncertain. In particular, the application of Sears and Compco against recent plaintiffs
relying on InternationalNews Service has not been consistent,
thereby contributing to the uncertainty surrounding all three Supreme Court opinions. Several of the lower court decisions which
attempt to reconcile InternationalNews Service, Sears and Compco
deserve mention.
Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting
Co. 2 involved an action brought by the publisher of a small town
newspaper to enjoin the owner of a radio station serving the same
community from appropriating any of plaintiff's local news stories
without its permission or authorization. The defendant sought to
remove the case to federal court, contending that a question of
federal copyright law was involved and that jurisdiction was exclusively in the federal courts. Alternatively, defendant maintained
that since property rights were claimed in the news, as opposed to
newspaper articles, plaintiff had no federal rights to exert, and
Sears and Compco precluded any state remedy.
21. 376 U.S. at 225.
22. Id. at 234.
23. Id. at 232.
24: See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron, 416
U.S. 470 (1974).
25. 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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Without deciding the merits, the court remanded the case to the
state court, concluding that plaintiff stated a valid claim for
invasion of property rights and unfair competition under state law,
citing InternationalNews Service." The court recognized that defendant's interpretation of Sears and Compco would leave plaintiff
without a remedy and "as a court of conscience, [we] will not
subscribe to such a conclusion unless the Supreme Court enlightens
us with a clear ruling on this specific problem." 7 Even assuming
that plaintiff's stories were copyrightable, the court did not read
Sears and Compco to preclude a state cause of action. Distinguishing copying and misappropriation, the court stated that the Copyright Act's prohibition against copying would not prevent defendant
from using the substance of plaintiff's news items as a basis for its
newscasts, and therefore a state remedy would not contravene federal policy." In conclusion, the court decided that the federal court
did not have exclusive jurisdiction and that the state court did have
jurisdiction.2
Grove Press,Inc. v. CollectorsPublication,Inc3 0 is another example of the use of a misappropriation theory for uncopyrightable
works. The plaintiff acquired exclusive rights to reproduce an original work, a work published without copyright in the nineteenth
century. Plaintiff then made some forty thousand changes, mostly
punctuation and spelling, and published the work. Defendant photocopied plaintiff's edition and, using an offset lithography process,
cheaply produced an identical edition under its own name. After the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, defendant published a
second edition without plaintiff's changes.
The court held that plaintiff acquired no copyright interests in the
original work because it was already in the public domain, and,
since all changes were trivial, plaintiff's own edition was uncopyrightable as a derivative work. Nevertheless, in view of plaintiff's
expenditure of substantial sums in setting type and engraving
plates, defendant's appropriation of the value and benefit of these
expenditures by photocopying plaintiff's work was held to be unfair
competition under InternationalNews Service. Defendant's second
edition was not a violation of any of plaintiff's rights because none
of plaintiff's changes were appropriated. The court simply dis26. Id. at 582.
27. Id. at 581.
28. Id. at 584.
29. The state court had already decided that it had jurisdiction over the matter. 411 Pa.
383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963).
30. 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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missed Sears and Compco as inapplicable.
The Grove Press case illustrates the application of equitable considerations in a factual setting different from that in International
News Service. This is not a case where the distinction between
copying and misappropriation is as readily apparent as in Pottstown. Whereas the defendant in Pottstown had taken advantage
of both plaintiff's news and its labors, the Grove defendant had
taken advantage only of plaintiff's labors and had merely copied
plaintiff's work. There was no apparent "property" or "quasiproperty" right in Grove. Thus, if the term "misappropriation" applies to the taking of some specific property right, Grove Press is
probably more accurately described as a case of unjust enrichment,
rather than misappropriation. Unjust enrichment requires that a
defendant disgorge that not rightfully his; misappropriation implies
3
the existence of something to be appropriated. '
The First Circuit Court of Appeals interrupted this line of case
law despite the equities in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
DeCosta32 (DeCostaI). The plaintiff, a mechanic by trade, adopted
the name "Paladin" and participated in rodeos, horse shows, parades and the like. He wore a costume which consisted of a black
shirt, black pants, black hat, a St. Mary's medal attached to the
hat, and a moustache. Plaintiff used the symbol of a chess knight
on his business card which read: "Have Gun Will Travel" and
"Wire Paladin, N. Court St., Cranston, R.I." His popularity grew
and he was soon making public appearances in hospitals, drug
stores, barber shops and diners. Some 250,000 of his cards were
distributed. The appearances were among "the purest promotions
ever staged" because plaintiff sold no product or service and
33
charged no fee.
Ten years after the inception of this role, plaintiff saw the first
television production of "Have Gun Will Travel" on CBS, featuring
a character called Paladin who dressed in an outfit virtually identical to plaintiff's and who introduced himself with a card featuring
a chess piece. Although the writers responsible for the series testified that the series was an independent creation, the lower court
found to the contrary and held for plaintiff on a theory of misappropriation of plaintiff's idea and character.
The court found on appeal that InternationalNews Service was
no longer controlling in view of Erie34 and Sears - Compco. While
31.
32.
33.
34.

D. DOBBS, REmEims §§ 4.1, 6.6 (1st ed. 1973).
377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967).
Id. at 316.
See note 14 supra.
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the court admitted that a state court could still adopt the reasoning
of InternationalNews Service in constructing a rule of state law, the
language of Sears and Compco was deemed determinative. Sears
and Compco, the court concluded, were to be read broadly, such
that any creation, whether or not intended to be protected by federal law, must comply with the requirements of the Copyright Act
or revert to the public domain. The court rejected plaintiff's principal argument that Sears and Compco were not determinative because plaintiff's character was neither a "writing" within the meaning of the Copyright Act nor an "article" within the meaning of
these authorities. Instead, the court stated that the overall federal
policy favoring free dissemination of intellectual creation must prevail. Protection against copying, which would grant a limited monopoly, could not be extended to a "character" which is "so slight
a thing as not to warrant protection by any law. 3' 5 Plaintiff's "chess
piece cards," unquestionably writings within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, were published without copyright notice and consequently were dedicated to the public. Accordingly, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court.
By broadly reading Sears and Compco, the DeCosta I opinion
appears to reject the reasoning of the Pottstown and Grove Press
decisions, but a close examination of the facts in DeCostaI suggests
otherwise. DeCosta's characterization of Paladin was without business motive, a lark. CBS's usurpation of this characterization was
not depriving DeCosta of any profits and, if anything, was further
popularizing his name. Thus, the equities in this case did not favor
plaintiff.
The Pottstown, Grove Press, and DeCosta I cases illustrate the
problem faced by plaintiffs whose intangible property rights, apparently unprotected by federal law, have been copied or misappropriated by others. Their creations fell within the "holes" of the
federal law of intellectual property and, as such, arguably could not
be protected by state law in the light of the Sears - Compco doctrine.
At least insofar as the Copyright Act was concerned, this problem
was remedied by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California.6
The Goldstein Court held that, in the absence of express inclusion
within the Copyright Act, subject matter which was not covered by
federal law could be regulated by existing state statutory law. More
35. 377 F.2d at 320. For cases denying protection to plaintiffs claiming similar property
interests, see Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), and Booth
v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
36. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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recently, the Supreme Court decided that state protection for trade
secrets was not preempted by the federal patent laws, since the
interests involved in the two bodies of law are sufficiently different. 7 Goldstein and Kewanee Oil seemingly narrow the scope of
Sears - Compco; however, they do not determine the uncertain relationship of state causes of action such as misappropriation and unjust enrichment with the federal scheme. This question has most
recently arisen in respect to property rights having the attributes of
both copyrights and trademarks. As will be seen, the difficulties in
the copyright-trademark interface are traceable not only to the imprecise definitions of the two property rights, but also to an uncertain role for equitable considerations in the law of intellectual property.
THE COPYRIGHT-TRADEMARK INTERFACE

An earlycase describing a copyright-trademark confrontation is
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.38 The plaintiff brought an unfair
competition action under the Lanham Act, 31 alleging that the defendant had copied the designs allegedly created and used by plaintiff
in its various lines of china. Neither copyright nor rights derived
from a registered trademark were claimed by plaintiff in the designs, although it did claim that the designs had become so associated in the minds of the public with plaintiff's business so as to
establish common law trademark rights through secondary meaning.
The court summarily rejected a cause of action based on misappropriation, concluding that InternationalNews Service was not
applicable to the copying of designs. The court found the claim
based on secondary meaning more difficult. The court assumed the
presence of secondary meaning and stated the well-established rule
that protection against copying will not be extended to "functional"
features, i.e., features which serve other than a trademark purpose
and are important ingredients in the commercial success of the
product. The court reasoned that the aesthetically pleasing designs
were an important selling feature of the china and were not adopted
solely to indicate origin of manufacture, and that, therefore, to grant
relief against copying in this situation "would render Wallace immune from the most direct and effective competition with regard to
37. See note 10 supra.
38. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
39. Since no registered trademark was involved, jurisdiction was apparently based on
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
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these lines of china."40 Since defendant included its name as manufacturer on the underside of all its china, the court found no likelihood of confusion and permitted defendant to continue using the
designs.
In the Pagliero case, unlike the previous cases considered, the
plaintiff probably could have prevented copying by obtaining a
copyright on the designs. The plaintiff did not obtain a copyright;
the court was reluctant to afford relief and prohibit imitation, because this would be granting protection tantamount to a copyright
monopoly, the protection that plaintiff waived by not proceeding
under the federal copyright law.4'
Two "poster cases" are further examples of the assertion of trademark rights in a factual situation more often associated with copyright infringement. In Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
Inc. ,2 defendant was engaged in the unauthorized printing and distributing of posters depicting a smiling girl dressed in the wellknown green uniform of the plaintiff's organization with her hands
clasped over her obviously pregnant abdomen. The words "Be Prepared" were printed next to her hands. In Coca-Cola Company v.
Gemini Rising, Inc. , 3 a defendant was printing and distributing
posters with the distinctive "Coca-Cola" script, except that the
letters "ine" had been substituted for "Cola" so that the poster read
"Enjoy Cocaine." In each case, the defendant's name appeared on
the poster in small type.
The plaintiff in Girl Scouts had several causes of action, some of
which were predicated on a criminal statute and some on defamation; but the claims asserting trademark rights are of interest here.
Plaintiff claimed federal and common law trademark rights in the
words "GIRL SCOUTS" with the letters G S and trefoil design, in
the slogan "BE PREPARED" and in the official uniform." Since
plaintiff was a non-profit organization, which did not compete with
defendant in the poster business, the requisite showing of likelihood
of confusion to establish infringement was difficult. Even though
the Girl Scouts presented evidence that they received calls from the
public expressing indignation over the posters, the court ruled that
40. 198 F.2d at 344.
41. Id. at 342-343. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19 (1970); National Comics Publications, Inc. v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951).
42. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
43. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
44. Plaintiff asserted causes of action under its federal registration 15 U.S.C. § 1114,
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and under the New York antidilution statute.
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evidence of confusion was lacking and that no injunction could be
issued.
In the Coca-Cola case, the virtually identical fact situation produced the opposite result. Since defendant was not in competition
with plaintiff, customers were not likely to confuse defendant's
goods with plaintiff's. Nevertheless, the court was able to distinguish Girl Scouts and grant relief. Because plaintiff was a profitmaking organization, it used posters as a common advertising technique, and the phone calls that plaintiff received as a result of
defendant's poster suggested confusion as to sponsorship of the
poster rather than mere "indignation." In granting plaintiff relief,
the court stated:
Even though in this case there is no confusion of goods or passing
off in the strict trademark sense, there is a sufficiently clear showing of the impairment of plaintiff's mark as a selling device because of defendant's use.45
The significance of the poster cases lies in the use of trademarks
to obtain relief in a situation beyond the scope of traditional trademark law. Both the Girl Scouts and the DeCostaI plaintiff had the
same handicap: the claimed rights were not being used in a profitmaking commercial setting. Thus, these plaintiffs failed to obtain
relief. Since the Coca-Cola plaintiff did not have this disadvantage,
it was able to convince the court of the damage to its goodwill and
business reputation.4 " Interestingly, neither the Girl Scouts nor
the Coca-Cola opinion, other than in one brief and ambiguous
reference,47 focused on the benefit derived by defendants, instead of
the harm done to plaintiffs.
In light of the difficulties presented by the poster cases, it is
understandable that the First Circuit Court of Appeals rested its
decision on the narrow grounds of an absence of likelihood of confu45. 346 F. Supp. at 1191.
46. The Coca-Cola Company alleged a violation of a New York statute, section 368-d of
the New York General Business Law, which includes injury to business reputation and dilution.
47. The Coca-Cola court noted: "Here there is no question that both [parties] are seeking
to attract public attention and patronage for their respective products by the graphic display
of a distinctive and widely known trademark." 346 F. Supp. at 1188. But see Flexitized, Inc.
v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 782 (2nd Cir. 1964), where the court, after finding
the trade mark "Flexitized" invalid as lacking secondary meaning, nonetheless granted the
plaintiff the relief requested on an unfair competition theory, stating: "Under these circumstances we think that defendants were properly chargeable with having misappropriated a
valuable property right or commercial benefit .....
"The court apparently relied more
heavily on the unjust benefit to defendants, than on the misappropriation of a property right
since the court held the property right nonexistant.
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sion in the second case of Decosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., (Decosta II).48 This case was before the court on counts
two and three of the complaint alleging common law trademark
and/or service mark infringement and unfair competition. After the
Decosta I court denied relief to plaintiff on the misappropriation
theory, the parties stipulated to a determination of counts two and
three by a magistrate. The magistrate found for plaintiff and defendant appealed, attacking both the ability of the magistrate to make
legal as well as factual findings and the merits of his decision. The
court devoted approximately half of its opinion to the first issue,
holding that the magistrate's factual findings were subject to the
clearly erroneous standard and that the legal rulings were subject
to full appellate review. The second half of the opinion discusses the
substantive aspects of the appeal and denies all relief to plaintiff.
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleged that the slogan "Have
Gun Will Travel," together with the figure of a chess knight and the
words "Wire Paladin" imprinted on his calling cards, constituted
his common law service marks which were infringed by defendant,
thereby appropriating plaintiff's goodwill and causing him serious
financial damage. The third cause of action alleged that defendant
copied plaintiff's service marks, manner of dress, and passed off
their television character Paladin as the original Paladin portrayed
by plaintiff, thereby unjustly profiting from and diluting plaintiff's
established goodwill.
In considering these two counts, the court recognized that subsequent case law mandated a retreat from its broad interpretation of
Sears and Compco which forbade state protection to writings not
covered by the Copyright Act. Under this prior interpretation, no
sanction, whether based on service mark infringement or unfair
competition, which would prohibit the copying permitted under federal law, could be imposed on defendant. This interpretation was
not applied in DeCosta H.
Instead, the court of appeals focused on that portion of Sears and
Compco which permitted state regulation of trademarks, labels and
distinctive trade dress.4 9 After noting that plaintiff conducted a
nonprofit venture and consequently could not claim the functions
48. 520 F.2d 499, 186 U.S.P.Q. 305 (1st Cir. 1975).
49. The court of appeals quoted from Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
232 (1964):
[A] state "may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such
markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of such goods."
520 F.2d at 509.
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served by a trademark or service mark (an indication of origin, a
guarantee of quality, and a medium of advertisement) in a commercial setting, the court magnanimously decided to assume the presence of valid common law service marks, including secondary
meaning. The issue then became whether the magistrate's finding
of likelihood of confusion, a factual question, was clearly erroneous.
On this point, the court transformed the defense of laches, derived
from plaintiff's eleven-year delay in filing suit, into an increased
quantum of proof of likelihood of confusion, with the burden on
plaintiff. The court reasoned that if no one is deceived after a substantial lapse of time, that fact is probative of the defense that there
is no likelihood of confusion arising out of the allegedly infringing
use. Faced with this increased burden, the plaintiff failed to satisfy
the court. The virtually identical nature of the marks was insufficient; extrinsic differences, such as the gross disparity in the size of
parties' audiences, the different type of "customers" or channels of
trade, and the haphazard way in which plaintiff performed, precluded a finding of likelihood of confusion. 0
The First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized "that plaintiff has
lost something of value to him. The very success of defendants'
series saturated the public consciousness and in time diluted the
attractiveness of plaintiff's creation."'" Nevertheless, plaintiff's loss
could not be protected under common law theories of service mark
infringement or unfair competition, and the equities of the case, as
discussed in regard to DeCosta I, were insufficient to support relief
on a misappropriation theory. DeCosta I and II, then, stand for the
proposition that mere copying of character, service mark, or trade
dress is insufficient to establish liability in the absence of copyright
or a strict showing of likelihood of confusion. 2
We now compare the previous series of cases, and in particular
DeCosta I and II, with the recently decided "patch" cases from the
Illinois courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
50. Plaintiff did present testimony of witnesses who stated that, on first viewing the
program, they believed that Paladin on television was the same person as plaintiff. The court
considered this evidence as minimal. "We do not blame plaintiff or counsel; we suspect that
the most exacting search for proof would not have produced more." 520 F.2d at 515, 186
U.S.P.Q. at 316.
51. 520 F.2d at 515, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 316.
52. Compare Wyatt Earp Enterprises Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), in which the producer-owner of the television series, "The Life and Legend of Wyatt
Earp," was granted an injunction against a manufacturer using the Wyatt Earp name and
character in connection with the advertising and sale of children's playsuits. The court found
that the name "Wyatt Earp" had acquired secondary meaning and that customers purchasing from defendant on the strength of the name were customers diverted from plaintiff's
licensee.
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These cases involved suits brought by the National Football
League Properties, Inc. and the National Hockey League Services,
Inc. against manufacturers of embroidered cloth emblems or
patches depicting the various team symbols. These patches are
often affixed to articles of clothing, such as jackets, sweatshirts, or
caps. However, the defendants involved in these cases were marketing the patches (with certain exceptions not relevant here) for retail
sale as individual unattached items, which could be used by the
consumer as souvenirs or in any other manner. The Illinois and Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals opinions will be discussed separately.
The Illinois courts were confronted with a pair of suits, National
FootballLeague Properties,Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises,Inc. 3 and
National Football League Properties,Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc.54 The National Football League Properties, Inc. (NFLP)
had been authorized by the 26 member clubs of the National Football League to act as the exclusive licensing agent for the team name
and symbol. The NFLP granted Lion Bros., Inc. the exclusive license to manufacture the embroidered symbols of each team. The
defendants, Consumer Enterprises Inc. (Consumer) and Dallas Cap
& Emblem Mfg., Inc. (Dallas Cap) had manufactured and sold the
identical patches without license or authorization. The symbols
were registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office as service marks for entertainment services, but plaintiff was seeking relief only under state law. In each
case, the NFLP alleged that the defendants' actions constituted
trademark infringement, unfair competition, injury to business reputation, dilution, deceptive trade practices, misappropriation of a
property right, misappropriation of a right of publicity, and injury
to business relationships. The NFLP sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin manufacture and sale of these emblems, representations that the articles sold by defendant were sponsored by the
NFLP or the NFL teams, and any other action likely to cause confusion.
In Consumer, the trial court originally granted a total injunction.
This was later modified by the appellate court to permit Consumer
to sell the patches with a disclaimer stating the lack of authorization
by the NFLP on the face of each emblem. This decision was again
modified to permit sale with the disclaimer on the face of each
package and on the back of each emblem. In Dallas Cap, the trial
court, relying on the appellate court's then current position, permit53.
54.

185 U.S.P.Q. 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
185 U.S.P.Q. 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
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ted sale of the emblems only with a disclaimer on the face of the
patch. Unlike the defendant in Consumer, the Dallas Cap defendants had affixed disclaimers to all of the patches that they sold.
These disclaimers were heat-sealed to the rear of the patch and
stated, "Not authorized by NFL or its members." Later, when the
Dallas Cap defendant-manufacturer learned of the Consumer decision requiring a disclaimer on the face of the patch, it added such
a disclaimer to the face of its patches. The NFLP appealed from this
partial injunction, seeking complete preliminary injunctive relief
prohibiting any sales of emblems.
The appellate court treated Consumer and Dallas Cap as companion cases and decided them on the same day, stating that its
decision in Consumer was dispositive of the issues in Dallas Cap.
The court found that plaintiff had a property right entitled to protection, that this property right was acquired by expenditure of
large sums of money, that the symbols possessed a strong secondary
meaning of identifying the clubs and performed the function of valid
service marks, and that a likelihood of confusion as to the source
existed. The court further found that a disclaimer would not prevent
confusion and was too difficult to frame and, thus, granted NFLP
the complete relief they requested. 5 Since the court found sufficient
basis for its decision under the Illinois law of trademarks, 5 common
law unfair competition, and the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices
Act,57 it did not reach the other causes of action raised by the NFLP.
Superficially, the cases appear run-of-the-mill. Ostensibly, the
NFL teams had several strong marks and the defendants, by copying these marks, had violated plaintiff's exclusive rights in these
marks. The difficulty arises from the manner in which the marks
were used by each party. When the symbols are used in connection
with football games, they are service marks which associate the
entertainment services of professional football with the individual
teams. When the symbols are embroidered on cloth and sold independently, they are no longer associating a service with the service
55. It is difficult to understand why a clearly worded disclaimer of authorization or sponsorship, placed either on the emblem or the package, woula not eliminate any confusion.
Plaintiff's survey witness in N.F.L.P. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 554,
556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), admitted that the presence of a disclaimer on the patches would have
made a difference in his survey of persons shown emblems. Appropriate labeling to avoid
likelihood of confusion was also approved in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
232-33 (1964); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir De
L'indus v. Alexander's Dept. St., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962); Eagle-Freedman-Roedelheim Co.
v. Allison Mfg. Co., 204 F. Supp. 679, 682 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
56. 185 U.S.P.Q. at 554; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 140, § 122 (1973).
57. 185 U.S.P.Q. at 554; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-/2, §§ 311 et seq. (1973).
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mark owner. They are being purchased as ornaments, to be used by
football fans to show their allegiance to a specific team. It is doubtful that the consumer believes, or even cares, that the manufacturer
of the patch is a professional football team or the NFL, especially
where the patches bear a statement expressly disclaiming any
connection with the NFL or its teams. The NFL symbols, when used
in this way, are not performing that function of a trademark which
indicates the origin of a commercial product., Moreover, since the
patches are nothing more than the mark itself, the property right
in issue is even more abstract, since a trademark can have no
existence in gross, unconnected with some business in which it is
used."
Despite these factors, the Illinois court found a property right in
the NFL symbols that was entitled to protection. While the court
considered this right within a trademark context, it failed to explain
its finding of likelihood of confusion as to source.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Boston Professional
Hockey Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,10 expressly recognized the problems not faced by the Illinois courts. The
issues in the Fifth Circuit were virtually identical to those of the
Illinois cases, except that the member teams of the National Hockey
League (NHL) were joined as plaintiffs and the complaint was
based on the Lanham Act instead of state statutory law." The district court enjoined defendant from manufacturing and selling
patches without disclaimers of authorization and/or conspicuous
designations of source placed on either the emblem or the package 2
and stated: "This remedy serves the interests of the public by preserving competition in the product while eliminating any unfair
appropriation of plaintiffs' goodwill as originators."" On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a sufficient
58.

See 3 R.

CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES

§ 66.3 (3d ed.

1969). The plaintiff in the Dallas Cap case introduced survey evidence in an effort to show
that the public believed that the Consumer and Dallas Cap patches were "official" or "authorized" by the NFL or its teams. The survey interviewees, however, were not shown the
Dallas Cap patches in a manner in which they could view the disclaimer.
59. United Drug Co. v. Rectanhs Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918). Also, see Prestonettes, Inc.
v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); and
Societe Comptoir de L'indus v. Alexander's Dept. St., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
60. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
61. In addition to common law unfair competition, the plaintiffs in Boston Professional
Hockey alleged causes of action based on trademark and service mark infringement, 15
U.S.C. § 1114, and under section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). As noted by the Illinois court in
Consumer, the test for infringement is identical under both federal and Illinois law. 185
U.S.P.Q. 550, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
62. 179 U.S.P.Q. 480 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
63. Id. at 484.
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showing of likelihood of confusion was demonstrated to warrant a
total injunction against defendant's unauthorized use.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district
court's opinion that the issuance of a total injunction in this case
would be equivalent to the creation of copyright monopoly for designs (the team symbols) which were not copyrighted. 4 The court
of appeals noted that this was a case of first impression and that
the copyright laws, which grant a limited monopoly in exchange for
the eventual passage of the copyrighted material into the public
domain, were based on an entirely different concept than the trademark laws, which protect business interests for the life of that business. In granting the full injunction, the court underlined three
"persuasive" points: (1) the major commercial value of the emblems
is derived from plaintiff's efforts, (2) defendant sought and probably
would have asserted an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems if it had been obtained,65 and (3) the sale of a reproduction
of the trademark itself on an emblem is an accepted use of the team
symbols in connection with the business of professional sports.
These three factors convinced the court that the designs symbolized
plaintiffs' business and constituted a protectable property right.
As to defendant's argument that trademark infringement must
depend on a finding of likelihood of confusion as to source, the court
said:
The confusion question here is conceptually difficult. It can be said
that the public buyer knew that the emblems portrayed the teams'
symbols. Thus, it can be argued, the buyer is not confused or
deceived. This argument misplaces the purpose of the confusion
requirement. The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the
fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and
sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of
the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were
in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. The argument
that confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the
emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by
the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem."6
64. The same issue arose under a somewhat different context in the Illinois cases. There,
the defendants argued that Sears and Compco prohibited state protection of unpatented or
uncopyrighted articles. Since they were merely copying articles (the symbols) which were not
protected by copyright, defendants contended that no state relief could be granted. The
Illinois Appellate Court distinguished Sears and Compco by concluding that plaintiff's marks
were not "articles" within the meaning of those cases.
65. Defendant applied for a license to manufacture the emblems, but the application was
rejected for the reason that defendant's emblems did not meet plaintiffs' quality standards.
66. 510 F.2d at 1012.
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This is a novel concept of likelihood of confusion in that it is predicated on the popularity and saleability of a trademark standing
alone, rather than on the confusion of the public as to who authorized or produced that trademark. 7 What is truly the property right
in the "patch" cases? As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals admitted, "our decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the
purpose of protecting the public to the protection of the business
interests of plaintiffs." 68 The "patch" cases involved the copying
and sale of the trademarks themselves, not the use of the trademarks in association with specific goods or services. 9 The relief
granted gives the trademark owner a monopoly for his symbols on
all goods and services. This is an extraordinary extension of the
ordinary trademark monopoly. The trademark laws have traditionally been concerned only with the application of marks to specific
goods and services and with preventing a likelihood of confusion in
the public by the use of a mark in association with the same or
related goods and services. These traditions appear to have been
ignored in the "patch" cases.
The NFL and NHL symbols have commercial value. To attach
this symbol to a product enhances its value to a certain class of
purchasers. However, this value is derived from the purchaser's association with the team. It is the popularity of the team which is
important to the emblem purchaser, not the quality of the emblem
or the business reputation of the manufacturer of the emblem. In
this sense, the patches can be likened to a Campbell's soup can or
a Coca-Cola bottle which has been duplicated for various pop-art
67. Another example of the distortion of conventional concepts of trademark law arises
out of recent cases dealing with the doctrine of "secondary meaning," which is commonly
defined as a strong association in the public mind between a mark, and the source of the
product bearing the mark. Recent judicial decisions indicate a departure from this traditional
definition. In Clairol Inc. v. Andrea Dumon Inc., 14 Ill. App. 3d 641, 303 N.E.2d 177, 179
U.S.P.Q. 119 (1973), the Illinois Court of Appeals held that proof of mere copying, together
with visual comparison showing similarity in use and appearance, was sufficient to establish
secondary meaning without further proof of an association in the public mind between the
mark and the source. Other cases have adopted this abbreviated method of showing secondary meaning. See Audio Fidelity Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th
Cir. 1960); and Clairol Inc. v. Cosway Co. Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 583, 586 (C.D. Cal. 1974). These
cases emphasize the intent and deliberation on the part of the infringer to copy, thereby
suggesting that confusion is not as important a factor in trademark infringement cases as it
was once thought to be.
68. 510 F.2d at 1011 (1975).
69. Exactly what the "goods" are in these cases was never really settled. If the symbol is
considered apart from the patch, it might be said that the "goods" are the cloth patches to
which the symbols are affixed. If the symbol and patch are considered as one, there are no
"goods" until the patch is sewn onto a sweatshirt or jacket.
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articles, such as wastebaskets, cigarette lighters and the like. As
such, it would appear that these NFL and NHL symbols are articles
which, in the absence of patent or copyright protection, should be
available for copying under Sears-Compco.
The Illinois and Fifth Circuit courts apparently felt that, because
the NFL and NHL had invested substantial efforts to make their
symbols valuable, another party should not be allowed to reap the
benefits of these efforts. This, however, is the case with all creative
works which are unprotected by patent or copyrights, and yet these
works can be copied under the federal policy enunciated by SearsCompco. Undoubtedly, the Illinois and Fifth Circuit courts recognized this problem and sought to avoid it by relying on traditional
notions of trademark and unfair competition law, since this area of
the law has explicitedly not been preempted by the policy of SearsCompco. Whether or not one may agree with the result, its basis
distorts traditional trademark law.
To protect against the copying of these uncopyrighted symbols
without distorting the existing legal framework, a court would have
to: (1) create a new property or quasi-property right, apart from any
goods or services, which represents the owner's goodwill, or (2) explicitly recognize that the equitable considerations of International
News Service have survived Sears and Compco, and provide a state
remedy for misappropriatiom or unjust enrichment. While the
"patch" cases appeared to be a perfect vehicle for the United States
Supreme Court to clarify the area of protection available to intellectual property after the Sears and Compco cases, certiorari was denied in the Boston ProfessionalHockey Association case on October
7, 1975.70
THE UNCERTAIN BASIS OF PROTECTION

Two recent cases illustrate two methods of protecting intangible
business interests not covered by the intellectual property framework without distorting the existing framework: (1) reliance on
equitable principles and (2) creation of a new property interest. In
Amway Corporation v. International Sales Aids, Inc.,7" an action
for trademark infringement and unfair competition, plaintiff was a
manufacturer of diverse consumer merchandise, such as cleaners,
polishers, insecticides, and soaps. Plaintiff's products were sold
through a network of distributors, most of whom were housewives
selling on a door-to-door basis. Plaintiff also sold to its distributors
70.
71.

Petitionfor cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3196 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
187 U.S.P.Q. 15 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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certain literature which described both plaintiff's marketing plan
and products. The literature contained plaintiff's trademark
AMWAY, which was registered in the Patent and Trademark Office
in nearly fifty different classes, including two registrations relating
to the use of the mark on printed material and on certain other
items of advertising and promotional material.
Defendant, an Amway distributor, started a business of publishing literature relating to Amway products and the Amway distribution program in competition with plaintiff. Defendant was not authorized to publish the literature by plaintiff, but instead copied
literature published by another unauthorized publisher. In so doing,
defendant reproduced plaintiff's trademark AMWAY. Plaintiff objected to the dissemination of these materials and the copying of its
trademark.
At the hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff
stressed that its extensive line of products subjected it to substantial government regulation in the areas of ecology and personal
health. Plaintiff also argued that it was susceptible to costly products liability suits and must use at least ordinary care in the
manufacturing and labelling of its products. Equally important,
plaintiff stated that it must use care in relation to the advertising
of its products and its sales program lest it be charged with false or
deceptive advertising. For these reasons, plaintiff argued that
Amway's goodwill and reputation were exceptionally important
business assets. Since the trademark AMWAY represented this
goodwill, plaintiff contended that its mark must be given special
protection. The court immediately recognized the problem presented by this argument:
It does not appear to the Court that the defendants have used the
reproductions of the marks as labels for their literature as trademarks are generally used to identify the source of goods. Rather,
the reproductions appear in the textual material disseminated by
2
the defendants.1
Nevertheless, the court held that defendant's use of the mark, the
use of plaintiff's other product names, and the content and tenor of
much of defendant's Amway material gave the impression that it
came from Amway or was at least authorized by it, even though
some of the literature identified defendant as the printer. The
court then found defendant liable for trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition and interference with contract.
72.

Id. at 20.
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Amway, like the "patch" cases, suggests that trademark infringement can exist even if the purchaser knows that the trademark
owner is not the source of the unauthorized goods, that is, even if
likelihood of confusion 'is not present.7 3 A clue to the actual theory
of protection is revealed in a closing paragraph of the Amway opinion:
[Tihe Court feels that the manufacturer should be free to disseminate his own materials about his products and his business without interference from outside sources like the defendants in this
case, regardless of by what name or names such interference may
be called. And the Court is convinced that this immunity from
interference should be protected by a court of equity in a case like
this one."
This concern for protecting a business from outside interference,
with the emphasis on doing what is fair and equitable, echoes the
reasoning and the language of InternationalNews Service.7 5
Rather than resting its holding solely on equitable principles, the
court in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.76 based liability on a property right. In this case plaintiffs were the widows of Laurel and
Hardy and a film distributor; all claimed rights under a 1961 contract and sued defendant Roach to determine the exclusive rights
to the Laurel and Hardy names and likenesses. Roach claimed his
rights under certain employment agreements with Laurel and
Hardy and under copyrights for certain motion pictures. Alternatively, Roach asserted that these names and likenesses were in the
public domain, and he was entitled to use them along with the
general public. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant misappropriated
"commercial Laurel and Hardy rights," produced confusion in the
marketplace as to the true ownership of the commercial rights to
Laurel and Hardy, conspired to misappropriate the Laurel and
Hardy rights, and interfered with and converted plaintiff's property
rights.
The court rejected defendant's claim of rights derived from contract. Despite a clause granting Roach certain rights to use each
actor's "name, voice and likeness for advertising, commercial
and/or publicity purposes," the court interpreted this and other
related clauses within the contract to be restricted to the limited
73. Even under a dilution statute, where competition is unnecessary, many states require a showing of likelihood of confusion. Alberto Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466
F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972).
74. 187 U.S.P.Q. at 22.
75. See note 12 supra.
76. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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term of the contract. Also, the court admitted that defendant's
copyrights entitled him to exclusive use of "stills" or single frames
from the movies, but these were not at issue. The court concluded
that neither defendant's ownership of copyrights nor plaintiff's failure to obtain copyrights was determinative, since "the issue here is
not one of copyright law.""
The argument that the Laurel and Hardy names and likenesses
were in the public domain proved more intriguing. In dealing with
this argument, the court first cited cases from various jurisdictions
supporting a property right termed a "right of publicity" in a person's use of his name and likeness,7" carefully distinguishing the
right of privacy and the New York statutory right protecting living
persons from commercial exploitation of their names and pictures.79
The court then distinguished a case where it was held that the
widow of Glenn Miller could not rely on property interests in the
Glenn Miller "sound" because such interests never existed.80 The
court also distinguished another case where the use of a "voice-over"
imitation of the plaintiff's television character in a commercial was
not actionable because the commercial at issue was anonymous and
did not use plaintiff's name and likeness to identify her as the source
of the voice. 8' Instead, the court stated:
Here we have determined that a property right does exist, such as
the court was unable to find in Miller, and that we are not concerned with an "imitation" such as was found by the Booth court.
Rather, we have here the situation specified by Booth as a different
one where the challenge is to the use of a person's "name or likeness."82

The court then concluded that since this right was "purely com77. Id. at 842.
78. The court principally relied on Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953). For other case discussions on the right of publicity, see Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th
Cir. 1969).
79. New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney's 1968). The right of privacy, often
confused with the right of publicity, should be carefully distinguished. The right of publicity
seems to be a property right which first becomes valuable when its owner attains sufficient
fame and notoriety. The right of privacy, on the other hand, is more in the nature of a civil
right which decreases in strength, for constitutional reasons, when its owner becomes a well
known "public figure." Nevertheless, this distinction is often blurred with discussion of the
commercial purposes for which a name or likeness are used. See, Arnold Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967).
80. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 47 (1st Dist. 1960), aff'd 10 N.Y.2d

972 (1961).
81.
82.

Booth v. Colgate Palmolive, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
400 F. Supp. at 845.
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mercial", it was assignable and survived death. The court, relying
on the holding of Goldstein v. California,3 held that the federal
copyright laws did not preempt this state-based right of publicity,
even though the state right was common law, not statutory. Finally,
the court ruled that there was no waiver or abandonment of this
right despite the failure of Laurel and Hardy to use their caricatures
and imitations for commercial purposes for fourteen years during
their lifetimes.
The "right to publicity" is a judicially created property right with
attributes of the traditional property rights of trademark and copyright. The right of publicity is similar to a trademark in that its
value is derived from public recognition. It is similar to a copyright
in that it is afforded protection against copying regardless of any
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. However, neither of
these recognized property rights were present in Price. While the
right of publicity is not original with the Price court, Price is one of
the few cases to base its decision on the survival of the right after
the death of its originators. 4
Since the right to publicity has always been considered a personal
right, to permit this right to survive death is to make it more like a
copyright than a trademark since the former, unlike the latter, survives it owner. On the other hand, the right of publicity is more like
a trademark than a copyright in that it is a perpetual right which
can last as long as the public recognizes the name.
CONCLUSION

The traditional boundaries of intellectual property law are no
longer sufficient to afford adequate protection for modern commercial practices. The case law has developed two solutions to this
problem: (1) drastic modification of the accepted definitions of intellectual property rights, and (2) expansion of the entire body of
law through the recognition of new, but clearly defined, property
rights or equitable considerations. Based upon the brief survey pre83. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
84. For a case with a similar holding, see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q.
541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), where the court held that Bela Lugosi's right to his likeness and
appearance as Count Dracula is a descendible property right and that plaintiff's cause of
action against defendant's unauthorized use of the name and likeness rests upon a tort theory
of appropriation of a property right.
It is apparent that the Price result conflicts with the DeCosta cases, which on the basis of
Sears and Compco, denied the plaintiff the right to exclusive use of the name Paladin. While
the DeCosta plaintiff labelled Count I of his complaint a misappropriation of "character,"
the substantive difference between this and the right of publicity does not seem great.

56
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sented in this article, the second approach should be preferred so
as to provide a logical body of law which is as flexible as the subject
matter it is intended to regulate. Modification has a tendency to
turn into distortion, and the established definitions and statutory
scope of protection accorded to the various traditional classes of
intellectual property should not be expanded and distorted in order
to accommodate equitable considerations and new property interests which were never intended to be included in these classes. The
courts should state whether they are enlarging the statutory definitions of intellectual property, relying on an equitable basis of liability, or constructing a new and separate property right, so that a
clear and uniform body of law can be developed.
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